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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK, : Case No. 20000541 -CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Due process and Utah R.Crim.P. 22(a) work together to require the trial judge to 
ensure that a full and fair sentencing proceeding occurs. When the trial judge does not 
afford counsel the opportunity to present mitigating information at sentencing and 
otherwise does not base the sentencing determination on relevant and reliable information 
after a full hearing, the error is obvious. This error requires that the sentence be vacated 
without a harmless error review. Moreover, the error was not harmless in this case where 
Mr. Wanosik was sentenced to a year and a half in jail rather than the twenty days 
recommended in the presentence report. 
A defendant does not knowingly and voluntarily waive the constitutional right to 
presence at sentencing unless he is informed that sentencing will proceed even if he is not 
present. This rule, articulated in United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 
1969), has been embraced by a number of other courts. In fact, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized in Crosby v. United States. 506 U.S. 255,113 S.Ct. 748, 752, 
122 L.Ed.2d 25 (1993) that a defendant's knowledge that a proceeding will be held even 
if the defendant does not appear cannot be assumed. In addition, since presence at 
sentencing is of even more importance than it is at trial, the different policy 
considerations governing the right to presence at sentencing require that a defendant not 
be sentenced in his absence unless extraordinary circumstances such as those in State v. 
Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996) exist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SENTENCED MR. WANOSIK IN ABSENTIA TO THE 
MAXIMUM SENTENCE WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT INFORMATION RELEVANT TO 
SENTENCING. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH 
R. CRIM. P. 22 WHEN IT SENTENCED MR. WANOSIK WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND 
WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
SPEAK TO SENTENCING. 
(Point IA of Appellant's opening brief; Points II and III of state's brief) 
Although the state acknowledges that the sentencing hearing in this case was 
abbreviated, it claims that due process and Rule 22(a) error did not occur because "the 
court never refused to hear counsel," "[n]either defense counsel nor the prosecutor 
requested the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing, and neither 
attorney objected to sentencing without such input." State's brief at 13. Utah R. Crim. 
P. 22(a) and due process require a trial judge to afford counsel the opportunity to present 
information relevant to sentencing regardless of whether counsel affirmatively requests 
the opportunity to present such evidence. Moreover, a review of the sentencing transcript 
demonstrates that Judge Frederick precluded defense counsel from presenting information 
relevant to sentencing and cut her off when she attempted to state her objections. 
R. 54:2-4; see Addendum A to this brief containing transcript of sentencing hearing. 
The plain language of Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) places on the trial court the 
obligation to afford defense counsel and the prosecutor the opportunity to speak at 
sentencing and to present information relevant to sentencing. While Rule 22(a) mandates 
that the trial court give the parties the opportunity to speak at sentencing, due process as 
outlined in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) requires that any sentence 
imposed by the judge be based on reliable and relevant information. Working together, 
Rule 22(a) and Johnson place the responsibility on the trial judge to make sure that a fair 
sentencing proceeding which meets due process requirements occurs. The error in failing 
to afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak on behalf of her client regarding the 
appropriate sentence and in otherwise failing to base the sentencing decision on complete 
information was obvious in light of Rule 22(a) and Johnson. See generally State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs where error is obvious and 
prejudices defendant). 
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The obviousness of the error in failing to afford counsel the opportunity to present 
information relevant to sentencing is bolstered by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (7) (1999) 
which mandates that the trial judge receive any information regarding the appropriate 
sentence which the parties desire to present. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) states, "[a]t 
the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the 
defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on 
the record and in the presence of the defendant." 
Moreover, it is evident from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the trial 
judge precluded defense counsel from presenting information relevant to sentencing and 
from otherwise completing her objections to the procedure. R. 54:2-3. The flat words of 
the judge demonstrate that the trial court failed to afford defense counsel the opportunity 
to address sentencing, and cut defense counsel off when she attempted to outline 
favorable information and again when she attempted to voice her objection to the 
procedure. R. 54:2, 3. After informing the judge that she believed Mr. Wanosik must be 
confused about the sentencing date and asking the judge to continue sentencing so that 
she could locate Mr. Wanosik, defense counsel began to outline the favorable 
recommendations in the presentence report. R. 54:2. The trial court interrupted, then 
concluded he would sentence Mr. Wanosik in absentia, and proceeded to sentence 
Mr. Wanosik without pausing to give defense counsel an opportunity to present 
4 
information relevant to sentencing. R. 54:2-3. The court completed its recitation by 
ordering the state to prepare an order, at which point, defense counsel interjected and 
attempted to make a record. R. 54:3. The trial court again interrupted defense counsel. 
R. 54:2-3. In addition, while it is apparent from the transcript that the trial judge did not 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing, the 
judge's tone, gestures and facial expressions on the videotape may well offer further 
indication that the trial judge precluded defense counsel from speaking on this issue. 
Under these circumstances where the error in not affording defense counsel the 
opportunity to address the court as to sentencing resulted in a sentencing determination 
based solely on Mr. Wanosik's nonappearance at sentencing, the due process and 
Rule 22(a) error was significant and obvious. 
The state argues that the record does not establish that the trial judge ignored the 
presentence report ("PSR") and its recommendation of twenty days jail and probation 
when he sentenced Mr. Wanosik to a year and a half of jail time after Mr. Wanosik did 
not appear at sentencing. State's brief at 16-18. According to the state, the trial court was 
not required to make explicit reference to the PSR or make detailed factual findings in 
support of its sentence, even though the sentence deviated substantially from the 
recommendations in the PSR. Id Contrary to the state's argument, the record adequately 
demonstrates that the trial judge disregarded the recommendations and information in the 
PSR and instead imposed a maximum sentence based solely on the failure to appear. 
5 
While defense counsel indicated on the record that the PSR was favorable, she was 
not afforded the opportunity to discuss the specific information or recommendations in 
that report. R. 54:1-4. Nor did the judge acknowledge the information or 
recommendations in any way during the hearing. See generally R. 54. The record 
therefore fails to demonstrate that the trial judge even considered the PSR 
recommendations in imposing sentence. Moreover, the requirement of section 77-18-1(7) 
that the information relevant to sentencing be presented in open court was not met. 
The report itself contained favorable information about Mr. Wanosik which 
supported probation rather than a maximum sentence. Mr. Wanosik had been married for 
twenty four years and had a stable work history. PSR:5, 8. The PSR confirmed only one 
conviction in 1995 for retail theft, along with four remote arrests in the early seventies 
without information as to whether Mr. Wanosik was convicted for those offenses. PSR:4. 
Based on Mr. Wanosik's background and the relatively minor nature of the crime, the 
PSR recommended that Mr. Wanosik be placed on probation, with one of the terms of 
probation being that he serve twenty days in jail. PSR: 11. The trial court's gross 
deviation from the PSR recommendation without acknowledging the details of the PSR or 
indicating the basis for the deviation likewise demonstrates that the trial judge failed to 
consider the information in the report when imposing sentence.1 
1
 The trial court was required to state its findings and conclusions in sufficient 
detail to "enable a reviewing court to accurately determine the basis for the trial court's 
decision11 regardless of whether counsel made a request for findings. State v. Hodges, 
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When the sentencing judge fails to consider complete and accurate information, 
the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing 
pursuant to Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-1075. In a case such as the present one where the 
trial judge did not afford counsel the opportunity to present information pertinent to the 
sentencing decision, conducting a harmless error review would undermine the due 
process requirement of a full and fair sentencing hearing. Since defense counsel was not 
afforded the opportunity to present relevant information, complete information favorable 
to the defendant is not in the record. Reviewing the record under these circumstances to 
determine whether the missing and unidentified information would have impacted on the 
sentencing decision would be ludicrous where the missing information is not part of the 
record due to the error. 
Additionally, the record demonstrates the harm caused by the trial court's failure 
to afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing 
and by otherwise failing to consider information relevant to sentencing. The PSR very 
clearly demonstrates that Mr. Wanosik was a candidate for probation. He had a stable 
marriage and work history and very minor criminal history. Adult Probation and Parole 
recommended a short stay in jail followed by probation and treatment. PSR. Had 
798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Rule 52(a), applicable to 
criminal proceedings under Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e) requires that trial judges make findings 
and separately state conclusions. "Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review" pursuant to that rule. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
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Mr. Wanosik appeared at sentencing, probation would have almost routinely been 
imposed in this case. 
The state argues, however, that Mr. Wanosik's nonappearance at sentencing so 
severely "altered the sentencing calculus1' that a year and a half in jail, as opposed to the 
recommended twenty days, was appropriate. State's brief at 15. In support of this 
argument, the state cites a single case from Arizona. In State v. Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 
691 (Ariz. App. 1986), after conducting a full sentencing hearing in the presence of the 
defendant, the judge aggravated the defendant's sentence based on his prior criminal 
history and the fact that he absconded from the jurisdiction between trial and sentencing. 
Id. at 691. The appellate court held that the defendant's criminal history and his 
absconding from the jurisdiction were properly considered as a basis for aggravating the 
sentence. Id. 
Hoover involved absconding from the jurisdiction, a more serious transgression 
than forgetting a court date. In addition, the trial judge in Hoover did not base the 
sentencing decision solely on the absconding, and instead considered Hoover's criminal 
history in conjunction with the act of absconding. Cf State v. Hammond, 854 P.2d 637, 
641 (Wash. 1993) (holding that sentence was improperly aggravated based on defendant 
absconding from the state).2 The court's consideration of the defendant's prior criminal 
2
 Additionally, failing to appear can constitute a separate crime of bailjumping. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-312 (1999). Since failing to appear could give rise to a 
separate crime, aggravating the sentence is not appropriate unless the crime is proved 
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history along with the fact that he absconded contrasts with the present case where the 
trial judge imposed a maximum sentence, apparently based solely on Mr. Wanosik's 
failure to appear at sentencing. 
In the present case, the trial judge imposed the maximum sentence based solely on 
Mr. Wanosik's nonappearance at sentencing. Considering Mr. Wanosik's nonappearance 
at all, let alone as the sole basis for imposing a maximum sentence, was improper since 
the nonappearance did not relate to the nature of the crime or Mr. Wanosik's background 
and was punishable through other means. In addition, even if a defendant's 
nonappearance at sentencing were a factor which could be considered in rendering 
sentence, the trial court nevertheless must afford defense counsel the opportunity to 
present other information relevant to sentencing and have a complete picture of the 
defendant and the crime in order to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing. See State 
v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980) ("A sentence in a criminal case should be 
appropriate for the defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also 
serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system"). 
Moreover, common sense dictates that imposing a maximum sentence based solely 
on a failure to appear at sentencing can result in sentences which are not appropriate in 
beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant at sentencing. See generally 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(b) (1999); State v. GallL 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998) 
(criminal activities for sentencing purposes are offenses for which the defendant has been 
convicted or for which he takes responsibility to the sentencing court); see also 
Hammond, 854 P.2d at 641 (sentence improperly aggravated based on absconding). 
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light of society's interests, the nature of the crime, or the defendant's background (see id) 
and which impact profoundly on criminal justice resources. While ramifications for 
irresponsible behavior in regard to court dates should and do exist3, the sentence itself 
should be based on a more complete view of the nature of the crime and the background 
of the defendant. In current circumstances where the Salt Lake County jail is releasing 
inmates due to overcrowding pursuant to a federal consent decree, filling the jail with 
misdemeanants who are irresponsible regarding their court dates but otherwise do not 
present a serious threat to society nor deserve a severe punishment makes little sense. 
By failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to present information 
relevant to sentencing and by otherwise failing to fully consider the nature of the crime, 
background of the defendant and other information relevant to sentencing, the trial judge 
erred. This error requires that the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for a new 
sentencing hearing. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
SENTENCING MR. WANOSIK IN ABSENTIA. 
(Point IB in Appellant's opening brief; Point I in state's brief) 
The state incorrectly claims that the trial court's determination that Mr. Wanosik 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at sentencing should be 
3
 When a defendant fails to appear at sentencing, a trial judge can issue a bench 
warrant for the defendant's arrest. The arrest itself and subsequent time spent in jail 
while waiting to see the judge are sufficient ramifications for failing to appear at 
sentencing. 
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reviewed for clear error. State's brief at 8. Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1108 directs that the 
issue of whether a trial judge properly sentenced a defendant in absentia should be 
reviewed for correctness. Moreover, when an appellate court reviews questions as to 
voluntariness, the ultimate issue as to whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waived a right is reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 
438 (Utah App. 1996) (reviewing ultimate issue as to whether consent to search was 
voluntary for correctness). Regardless of whether the findings and conclusions 
characterize a voluntariness determination as a factual finding, the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion that Mr. Wanosik knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence 
should be reviewed for correctness. 
The right to presence at trial and the right to presence at sentencing are distinct 
rights which are governed by distinct policy considerations. See United States v. Turner. 
532 F. Supp. 913, 915 (1982); State v. Fettis. 664 P.2d 208, 209 (Ariz. 1983). While 
trying a defendant in absentia may be appropriate in some cases, different considerations 
and stricter controls should apply when deciding whether to sentence a defendant in 
absentia. See Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915; Fettis. 664 P.2d at 209. The reason for this 
distinction is that while a defendant's decision to absent himself from trial "may 
immobilize or frustrate the justice system," such danger "has largely although not entirely 
disappeared" after the defendant has been convicted. Turner. 532 F. Supp. at 915. The 
minimal risk associated with the delay of an appeal and possible retrial caused by failing 
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to appear at sentencing is, in most cases, far outweighed by the importance of a 
defendant's presence at sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915. 
ff[T]he common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present at his 
sentencing." Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915; see also United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 
955 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citation omitted) ("'The requirement that the defendant be present 
when sentence is passed has deep common law origins.'"). Presence is of critical 
importance to sentencing not only because it allows judges to be presented with all of the 
information needed for a full sentencing hearing, but it also allows the judge to question 
and admonish the defendant. Indeed, "[i]t is only when the defendant is before the court 
that a reasonable and rational sentencing can take place." Fettis, 664 P.2d at 209. 
Presence is of instrumental value to the defendant for the exercise of other 
rights, such as to present mitigating evidence and challenge aggravating 
evidence, and it may also be advantageous to him that the decision maker 
be required to face him. The state may have an interest in the presence of 
the defendant in order that the example of personal admonition might deter 
others from similar crimes. Moreover, it may sometimes be important that 
the convicted man be called to account publicly for what he has done, not to 
be made an instrument of the general deterrent, but to acknowledge 
symbolically his personal responsibility for his acts and to receive 
personally the official expression of society's condemnation for his 
conduct. The ceremonial rendering of judgment may also contribute to the 
individual deterrent force of the sentence if the latter is accompanied by 
appropriate judicial comment on the defendant's crime. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915. 
In addition to ensuring that a full and fair sentencing occurs, presence of the 
defendant at sentencing preserves the dignity of individuals being sentenced as well as the 
12 
system itself. 
Respect for the dignity of the individual is at the base of the right of a man 
to be present when society authoritatively proceeds to decide and announce 
whether it will deprive him of liberty. It shows a fundamental lack of 
respect for the dignity of a man to sentence him in absentia. The presence 
of the defendant indicates that society has sufficient confidence in the 
justness of its judgment to announce it in public to the convicted man 
himself. Presence thus enhances the legitimacy and acceptability of both 
sentence and conviction. 
Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 915-916 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The importance of 
presence at sentencing "militate[s] against a rule allowing presence at sentencing to be 
waived." Id at 916. 
Because of the critical importance of presence to sentencing, many jurisdictions 
refuse to allow sentencing in absentia except in extraordinary circumstances. Fetfis, 664 
P.2d at 209. Such extraordinary circumstances, while "rare indeed" (Fettis, 664 P.2d at 
209), include circumstances where a defendant has expressly waived his right to be 
present at sentencing. See Turner, 532 F. Supp. at 916 (citing United States v. Brown, 
456 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 415 U.S. 960, 94 S.Ct. 1490, 39 
L.Ed.2d 575 (1974)). Extraordinary circumstances allowing sentencing in absentia may 
include circumstances where the defendant has been fully informed that sentencing will 
proceed in his absence if he does not appear. See Lowery v. State, 759 S.W.2d 545, 546 
(Ark. 1988) (court unwilling to find defendant waived right to presence at sentencing "in 
the absence of language specifically advising an accused that he is subject to being 
13 
sentenced prospectively without his being present"); People v. Link. 685 N.E.2d 624, 626 
(111. App. 1997) (court requires that defendant must be "warned his failure to appear may 
result in the proceedings continuing in absentia" in order to sentence a defendant in 
absentia); People v. Bennett. 557 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (reasoning that 
sentencing in absentia was permissible where defendant was fully advised that sentencing 
would occur in his absence if he failed to appear); People v. Harris. 564 N.Y.S.2d 481 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (same); People v. Christopher R.. 522 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1987) (same). 
These cases requiring that a defendant be informed that sentencing will proceed if 
he fails to appear in order to sentence in absentia adopt the standard outlined in 
McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1129 and advocated by Mr. Wanosik in his opening brief at 14-
17. Contrary to the state's assertion on pages 9-12 of its brief, the McPherson rationale 
that a defendant cannot knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence at 
sentencing unless he is informed that sentencing will proceed in his absence remains good 
law and is supported by a number of decisions. 
Furthermore, the state's claim that Taylor v. United States. 414 U.S. 17 (1973) 
"effectively overruled" McPherson (state's brief at 10) is incorrect. First, the existence of 
these post-Taylor cases applying the McPherson rationale in addition to the Utah 
Supreme Court's reliance McPherson in Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 demonstrate that 
Taylor did not overrule McPherson. A review of Taylor itself further demonstrates that 
14 
Taylor does not preclude the McPherson analysis or otherwise "effectively overrule" 
McPherson. 
Significantly, Taylor involved a defendant's failure to appear at trial rather than 
sentencing. Taylor, 414 U.S. at 19. Because different concerns govern the waiver of the 
right to sentencing than govern the waiver of the right at trial, the holding of Taylor does 
not impact on McPherson. Moreover, since Taylor absented himself after the trial had 
begun, Taylor's knowledge that the proceedings which had already begun would be 
concluded was evident. See Crosby, 113 S.Ct. at 749, 752 (recognizing that mid-trial 
flight demonstrates a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be present). In fact, 
subsequent to Taylor, the United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of the 
distinction between absenting oneself after a trial has begun and not appearing at all. Id. 
at 752. The Court concluded that while a knowing waiver existed when a defendant 
absented himself mid-trial, such was not the case when the defendant did not appear at 
all. Id at 752. Accordingly, the Court held that a trial in absentia could not be held 
pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. P. 43 when the defendant was not present at the beginning of 
the trial. Id at 752-53. 
The Supreme Court's analysis in Crosby provides further support for the 
McPherson requirement that a defendant must be informed that sentencing will proceed in 
his absence if he does not appear in order to knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to 
presence at sentencing. The Supreme Court recognized that it cannot be assumed that a 
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defendant who fails to appear knows that the proceedings will go on without him, stating 
f,
'[s]ince the notion that trial may be commenced in absentia still seems to shock most 
lawyers, it would hardly seem appropriate to impute knowledge that this will occur to 
their clients." Crosby, 113 S.Ct. at 752 (citation omitted). 
The annotation cited by the state indicates that a significant number of jurisdictions 
require something more than a failure to appear in order to proceed with sentencing in the 
defendant's absence. See state's brief at 11 (citing Christopher Hall, Annotation, 
Voluntary Absence of the Accused When Sentence is Pronounced, 59 A.L.R. 5th 135 
(1998)). Rather than demonstrating a clear majority position as claimed by the state, the 
Annotation shows that a number of jurisdictions ordinarily require that a defendant be 
present for sentencing when the defendant has not been warned of the consequences for 
failing to appear. kL at 149-153, 158. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is consistent with the McPherson 
approach and must be read in light of the facts and policy considerations relevant to 
circumstances under which Anderson failed to appear. Because Anderson was warned of 
the consequences of failing to appear and had signed a written waiver of his right to 
presence in which he agreed to be tried in absentia, requiring that a defendant be warned 
of the consequences of nonappearance in order to find a knowing waiver of the right to 
presence fits squarely within the Anderson holding. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. 
Relying on McPherson, the Anderson Court stated, ff[t]o intentionally relinquish the right 
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to be present, the defendant must have notice of the proceedings. United States v. 
McPherson. 421 F.2d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1969)." Anderson. 929 P.2d at 1110. Since 
the notice required in McPherson was that the sentencing would proceed without the 
I 
defendant on a given date if the defendant did not appear, and the defendant in Anderson 
likewise had notice that the proceedings would continue without him if he did not appear, 
this reliance on McPherson in Anderson can be read as requiring that the defendant be 
given notice that the sentencing will occur even if he does not appear in order to be 
sentenced in absentia. 
The Supreme Court decision in Anderson is also distinguishable from the present 
case because the trial court, as the result of the written waiver, properly tried Anderson in 
absentia. The Supreme Court looked to similar circumstances where a defendant was 
properly tried in absentia and had not shown up by the time of sentencing. Anderson, 929 
P.2d at 1110. Because it would create an anomaly to be able to try a defendant in 
absentia who has affirmatively waived the right to presence, but then be unable to 
sentence him in absentia, the Supreme Court held that sentencing Anderson after he had 
expressly waived his right to presence at trial was appropriate. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 
1110. The Anderson court did not consider, however, the current circumstances where a 
defendant had entered a plea but later failed to appear at sentencing. 
Anderson is also distinguishable from the present case because the balance 
between society's interests in sentencing in absentia and Anderson's interest in being 
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present tipped in favor of proceeding with the sentencing, whereas in the present case, the 
balance tipped in favor of continuing the sentencing and allowing defense counsel the 
opportunity to bring Mr. Wanosik before the court. Anderson had left the state with the 
permission of the court. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108. He executed a "written and oral 
agreement to be tried in his absence should he fail to appear at trial." Id "Although 
Anderson contacted pretrial services shortly before the trial date, he subsequently 
disappeared." Id. Because Anderson had disappeared while out of state, the Court 
reasoned that he could absent himself for years, thereby impeding the administration of 
justice. Id. at 1111. By contrast, as set forth in Mr. Wanosik's opening brief at 19-20, the 
potential of Mr. Wanosik absenting himself for years does not exist in this case where 
Mr. Wanosik had been married for twenty-four years, had a stable work history and had 
lived in Utah all of his life. PSR. 
As a final matter, Rules 22(b) and 17(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure do not preclude a requirement that a defendant be warned that sentencing will 
proceed without him if he does not appear in order to knowingly and voluntarily waive 
the right to presence at trial. Rule 22(b) states, "[o]n the same grounds that a defendant 
may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's 
absence." Rule 17(a)(2) states, "the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after 
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a 
verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
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present." When read together, Rules 17(a)(2) and 22 directly address the imposition of 
sentence in the Anderson situation where a defendant is given notice of a trial date, fails 
to appear at trial, and is tried in absentia. These rules clarify that under those 
circumstances, sentencing in absentia is appropriate. Moreover, the "grounds" for trying 
a defendant in absentia are whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily absented 
himself. Those same grounds apply to sentencing in absentia-that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily absented himself. For there to be a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to presence in the sentencing context, the defendant must be informed 
on the record that if he does not appear, the court will nevertheless proceed with 
sentencing. 
Rules 22 and 17 must be read so as to meet constitutional requirements. In order 
to comply with the Article I, section 12 right to presence, Rules 22 and 17 allow a trial 
court to proceed with sentencing in absentia only if the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waives his right to presence; for there to be a knowing and voluntary waiver, 
the defendant must be informed that sentencing will proceed even if he is not present. 
See discussion supra at 13-17 and in Appellant's opening brief at 14-17. The notice and 
grounds required to sentence a defendant in absentia therefore include notice that the 
hearing will proceed if the defendant does not appear. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
This case presents an important question as to whether a trial judge can sentence 
19 
criminal defendants in absentia when the defendant was not informed that the sentencing 
would occur if he was not present. The circumstances in this case differ substantially 
from those in Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107 and require clarification from this Court as to (1) 
whether a distinction exists between sentencing a defendant in absentia who has executed 
a written waiver of the right to presence at trial, and sentencing a defendant in absentia 
where the defendant has appeared for trial proceedings but fails to appear at sentencing, 
and (2) whether a defendant must be informed that sentencing will proceed if he does not 
appear in order to have a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence at 
sentencing. In addition, this case raises an important issue as to whether the trial judge is 
required to make sure that a full and fair sentencing proceeding occurs by affording 
counsel the opportunity to present any information relevant to sentencing. The trial judge 
in this case has sentenced a significant number of defendants in absentia to the maximum 
term under circumstances similar to those in this case. A number of those defendants 
have appealed to this Court. See e^g. State v. Payne, Case No. 20000497-CA; State v. 
Hamling. Case No. 20000813-CA; State v. Rogers. Case No. 20000812-CA; State v. 
Samora. Case No. 20000884-CA; and State v. Vicente. Case No. 20000955-CA. The 
issues raised in this appeal and the significant number of defendants affected by this 
Court's decision require that the case be fully analyzed and explored, and that a 
controlling decision be issued. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Anthony James Wanosik respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand the case for a new sentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22^L day of December, 2000. 
\jk*-£ u)^Y 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appe lhjnt 
CATHERINE E. LILLY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ANDREA J. GARLAND 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be hand-delivered the 
original and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this PI^L day of 
December, 2000. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office this day of December, 2000. 
22 
ADDENDUM A 
ftft/G/Mll 
-1-
FILED DISTRICT CO 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANTHONY JAMES WANOSIK 
Defendant. 
JUN 3 0 2000 
BAUUVKECOl 
lutydltrk 
Case No. 001905943 FS 
BEFORE: 
Sentencing Hearing 
Electronically Recorded on 
May 26, 2000 
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Third District Court Judge 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
Nick D'alesandro 
Cnty - Dpty Dist Atty 
2001 South State # S-3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Telephone: (801)468-3422 
Andrea Garland 
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC 
214 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)328-9531 
T r a n s c r i b e d by: B e v e r l y Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVENUE 
PROVO, UTAH 84606 
TELEPHONE: (801)377-0027 
FILED 
;UL 2 8 ?G00 
COURT OF APPEAL^ 
JRT 
-<LA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
-2-
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on May 26, 2000) 
THE COURT: Your Honor, my last matter before you is 
Anthony James Wanosik, and I've looked for him but I've not 
been able to find him, your Honor, He did obtain his pre-
sentence report, 
THE COURT: Is Anthony James Wanosik in the courtroom? 
(No response) 
THE COURT: Yes, let's discuss_that matter for a 
moment. This is case No. CR00-5943. Ms. Garland, you're 
appearing in his behalf? 
MS. GARLAND: I am, your Honor. I think given that he 
did go and obtain his pre-sentence report he was intending to 
show up today, and so I would ask that you hold on to any 
warrants and give me a chance to find him. I believe he may 
have simply written down the wrong date. 
THE COURT: Well— 
MS. GARLAND: I believe that, Judge, because this is a 
fairly favorable pre-sentence report, so he would have had no 
reason to try and avoid court today, it would— 
THE COURT: Presumably. 
MS. GARLAND: Yes, it would have been in his best 
interest to appear. 
THE COURT: I think in the meantime, counsel, given 
his failure to appear I will terminate his pre-trial release, 
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1 issue a warrant for his arrest returnable forthwith no bail. 
2 My inclination is to sentence him today, and I recognize you 
3 would prefer that I did not, but I am inclined to do so. It is 
4 curious that he has failed to appear today, although I can only 
5 assume because he has not been in touch with you nor has he 
6 been in touch with my court that he has chosen to voluntarily 
7 absent himself from these proceedings. 
8 Consequently, it is the judgment and sentence of this 
9 Court that he serve the term provided by law in the adult 
10 detention center of one year for the class A misdemeanor crime 
11 of attempted possession of a controlled substance, and six 
12 months for the possession of a controlled substance, a 
13 misdemeanor charge to which he has pled guilty. I will order 
14 that those terms be served concurrently and not consecutively, 
15 and that they be imposed forthwith. 
16 Ms. Garland, in the event he is in touch with you or 
17 shows up before he's arrested, then you may approach me, but in 
18 the meantime, Mr. D'alesandro, you prepare the findings of fact 
19 conclusions of law and order determining voluntary absent 
20 compliance, and that will be the order. 
21 MS. GARLAND: Judge, I would object to that order 
22 because I don't think that it takes into account his due 
23 process rights or his rights about— 
24 THE COURT: Right. 
25 MS. GARLAND: However, I realize that's your order. 
-4-
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. I'll grant ^iw 
credit for the eight days he served originally awaiting 
imposition or a resolution. 
MS. GARLAND: All right. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Ms. Garland. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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